Time: 10:30-11:30am, Nov. 12th, 2019, Tuesday
Venue: RoomA1514, Science Building, North Zhongshan Road Campus
Spreker: Associate Professor HaoYu Gao, RenMin University of China
Abstract：We provide the first large-sample evidence of selective default on government debt. Using comprehensive loan-level data, we find that local governments in China choose to default on banks with weaker political power. Defaulting on the loans from powerful banks hurts the promotion chances of local politicians, except those who are highly ranked or connected to national leaders. Consequently, relatively more powerful local politicians engage less often in selective defaults on bank loans. In contrast, we do not observe such creditor discrimination for local government bonds, for which the identities of bondholders are often unknown due to secondary market trading.
Speaker’s Bio：高昊宇博士，现为中国人民大学金融学副教授。研究兴趣主要集中在公司金融、金融中介与金融市场、中国资本市场等方面。相关成果发表（接受）在Review of Financial Studies (RFS), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA)、《金融研究》和《中国管理科学》等国内外金融学顶级刊物。
