时间：2019年11月12日(周二)上午10:30-11:30
地点：中山北路校区理科大楼A1514会议室
题目：Subnational Debt of China: The Politics-Finance Nexus
报告人：高昊宇 副教授 中国人民大学
摘要：
We provide the first large-sample evidence of selective default on government debt. Using comprehensive loan-level data, we find that local governments in China choose to default on banks with weaker political power. Defaulting on the loans from powerful banks hurts the promotion chances of local politicians, except those who are highly ranked or connected to national leaders. Consequently, relatively more powerful local politicians engage less often in selective defaults on bank loans. In contrast, we do not observe such creditor discrimination for local government bonds, for which the identities of bondholders are often unknown due to secondary market trading.
报告人简介：
高昊宇博士，现为中国人民大学金融学副教授。研究兴趣主要集中在公司金融、金融中介与金融市场、中国资本市场等方面。相关成果发表（接受）在Review of Financial Studies (RFS), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA)、《金融研究》和《中国管理科学》等国内外金融学顶级刊物。
